‘There ’s a traditional distinction between the synthetic and analytic operations of the intellect: the synthetic operation builds parts into wholes, while the analytic operation breaks wholes into parts. The distinction seems to have lost its usefulness among moderns, as thought becomes an unclarified mess of mush. And reductionism results from this amnesia, as we forget that one mind cannot do both operations at the same time on the same object.

Synthetic assertions always melt away under analytic examination. The unclarified mind concludes that this proves the synthesis was a mirage. But it proves nothing except what older thinkers understood: one eye can’t see exactly what the other eye sees. The vanished assertion is normal and is a function of the mind, but it says nothing about the authenticity of the synthetic assertion itself.

You can’t see wholes with a parts-instrument; likewise, you can’t see parts with a wholes-instrument. You can’t check decibels with a spectroscope. That wholes are more than the sum of parts is not a provable proposition, if by “proof” we mean what the analytical function appropriately specializes in. It’s simply that the organic wholes and the mechanical parts are noticed, studied, and even loved by different instruments.